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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in two major
electronic surveillance cases last term again tried
to interpret Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.' In United States v.
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976) [hereinafter Title III].
Congress passed Title III to establish standards for judi-
cial authorization of wiretaps and other forms of elec-
tronic surveillance that would meet the fourth amend-
ment requirements set out in Berger v. United States, 388
U.S. 41, 44 (1967) (New York's permissive eavesdrop
statute was "too broad in its sweep resulting in a trespas-
sory intrusion into a constitutionally protected area" and
thus violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments);
and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (the
fourth amendment requires judicial authorization before
the government can wiretap phone booth conversations).
Several Supreme Court cases have interpreted various
provisions of Title m. See notes 19-22 and accompanying
text infra.
The two most recent cases interpreted §§ 2510(4),
2510(8), 2518(1) and 2518(5) of Title II. The text of
these provisions states that:
§ 2510. Definitions
As used in this chapter-
(4) 'intercept' means the aural acquisition of any
wire or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device;
(8) 'contents,' when used with respect to any wire
or oral communications, includes any information
concerning the identity of the parties to such com-
munication or the existence, substance, purport, or
meaning of that communication;
§ 2518 Procedure for interception of wire or oral
communications
(1) Each application for an order authorizing or
approving the interception of a wire or oral com-
munication shall be made in writing upon oath or
affirmation to ajudge of competint jurisdiction and
shall state the applicant's authority to make such
application.
(5) No order entered under this section may
authorize or approve the interception of any wire
or oral communication for any period longer than
is necessary to achieve the objective of the authori-
zation, nor in any event longer than thirty days.
... Every order and extension thereof shall contain
a provision that the authorization to intercept shall
be executed as soon as practicable, shall be con-
ducted in such a way as to minimize the interception
of communications not otherwise subject to inter-
New York Telephone Co.,2 the Court ruled that Title
III did not pertain to pen registers3 The Court
held that under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,4 courts can authorize the in-
stallation of pen registers. In addition, the Court
held that the All Writs Act5 gives district courts the
power to compel telephone companies to help gov-
ernment authorities install pen registers. In Scott v.
United States,6 the Court decided that to determine
ception under this chapter, and must terminate
upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in
any event in thirty days.
2434 U.S. 159 (1977).3 According to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit:
A pen register is a mechanical instrument attached
to a telephone line, usually at a central telephone
office, which records the outgoing numbers dialed
on a particular telephone. In the case of a rotary
dial phone, the pen register records on a paper tape
dots or dashes equal in number to electrical pulses
which correspond to the telephone number dialed.
The device is not used to learn or monitor the
contents of a call nor does it record whether an
outgoing call is ever completed. For incoming calls,
the pen register records a dash for each ring of the
telephone, but does not identify the number of the
telephone from which the incoming call originated.
... The device used for touch tone telephones, the
TR-12 touch tone decoder, is very similar to a pen
register, differing primarily in that it causes the
digits dialed on the subject telephone to be printed
in arabic numerals, rather than dots or dashes,
corresponding to the electrical pulses.
Application of United States in Matter of Order Author-
izing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 957 (2d
Cir. 1976) (citation omitted).
'The court discussed two parts of Fn. R. CRm. P. 41.
One is 41(b) which authorizes courts to issue warrants to:
"search for and seize any (1) property that constitutes
evidence of the commission of a criminal offense; or (2)
contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise crim-
inally possessed; or (3) property designed or intended for
use or which is or has been used as the means of commit-
ting a criminal offense."
Section 41(h) defines property "to include documents,
books and any other tangible objects."
528 U.S.C. § 165 1(a) (1970). The All Writs Act pro-
vides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appro-
priate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
to the usages and principles of law."
'98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978).
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whether a government agent has complied with
the minimization requirement of Title III, 7 a court
must make an objective finding as to whether the
government agent has minimized his interception
of non-relevant phone calls. The intent of the agent
is not relevant. Instead, the court must decide
whether a reasonable man would have intercepted
all of the calls that the agent did.
These two cases are the most recent results of
continuing efforts on the part of the United States
Congress and the federal courts to delimit the ways
in which electronic surveillance devices can and
should be used consistent with the fourth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.! In early
cases, the Court held that the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches only
protected tangible property. In Olmstead v. United
States,9 the Court ruled that wiretapping was not a
"search" within the fourth amendment meaning of
that word. Rather, wiretapping was only forbidden
by the fourth amendment when there was an "ac-
tual physical invasion" of the property. 0 Congress
reacted to Olmstead by passing the Communications
Act of 1934,11 which banned all wire or radio
interceptions that were not authorized by the
sender. In 1966, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that pen registers were covered by the
1934 Communications Act.'
2
Since Olmstead, the Court has followed the lead
of the Communications Act and has begun to
recognize that privacy, as well as property, is also
protected by the fourth amendment. In two 1967
cases, Berger v. United States'1 and Katz v. United
States,"'4 the Court rejected the Olmstead view that
wiretapping was not a search unless it physically
invaded the property of another. And, each of these
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). See note I supra.
'U.S. CONsT. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
detcribing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
9277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
1 Id. at 466.
" 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). The relevant portion of this
statute provides "no person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person ....
"2 United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966).
'3 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
14 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
cases established detailed procedures which had to
be followed for the use of electronic surveillance
devices to constitute a "reasonable" search.'5
In response to these two decisions, Congress
passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act,16 requiring judicial authorization
for electronic surveillance. According to Title III,
the authorization may ensue only after the govern-
ment has complied with a detailed set of procedures
designed to ensure that the electronic surveillance
meets the constitutional requirements set forth in
Berger and Katz. Title III also amended § 605 of
the Communications Act of 1934 so that it pertains
only to "radio communications" and not to wire
communications like telephones.
17
Since the passage of Title III, federal courts have
been trying to determine which forms of electronic
surveillance are regulated by the statute and what
procedures the statute requires. Most of the deci-
sions have interpreted Title III as giving the gov-
ernment great flexibility in its use of electronic
surveillance devices. For example, in three of the
four major electronic surveillance cases decided
under Title III prior to New York Telephone Co. and
Scott, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title III
liberally to allow the government to use the fruits
of electronic surveillance.' 8 In United States v. Kahn,' 9
for example, the Court held that the government
15 Berger requires that ajudge must find probable cause
that a crime is being committed before authorizing a
wiretap. The authorization must list the place to be
wiretapped, the conversations to be sought and the iden-
tity of the person whose conversations are to be inter-
cepted. The wiretap must be promptly executed, and the
government must inform the judge how it was executed
and what was seized. 388 U.S. at 56-60.
Katz requires antecedent judicial authorization before
the government can conduct wiretaps. 389 U.S. at 359.
16 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20.
' This statute now reads: "§ 605 Unauthorized pub-
lication or use of communications ... No person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio
communication .... 47 U.S.C. § 605 (emphasis added).
18 The only case which interpreted Title III very
strictly was United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505
(1974). In Giordano, the application for a wiretap had
been authorized by the executive assistant to the Attorney
General. However, Title III requires that the application
must be authorized by the "Attorney General, or any
assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the
Attorney General." 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). After examining
the statute's legislative history, the Court reasoned that
Congress wanted specific politically responsive officials to
authorize the application and held that the evidence
resulting from the wiretap authorized by the executive
assistant had to be suppressed.
is415 U.S. 143 (1974).
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could use evidence obtained against a person
through electronic surveillance even though that
person had not been identified as a subject of the
surveillance in the government's application for
permission to use an electronic surveillance device
if, at the time of the application, there had not
been probable cause to believe that the person was
committing a crime. .Furthermore, in United States
v. Chavez,2' the Court held that if the Attorney
General has authorized an application for a wire-
tap, the evidence obtained thereby is admissible
even though the application itself mistakenly says
that it was authorized by the assistant Attorney
General. Finally, the Court in United States v. Don-
ovan held wiretap information admissible even
when the identification and notice provisions of
Title III were violated; in that case, the Court said
that these provisions were not central to the stat-
ute.2 New York Telephone Co. and Scott continue this
trend of liberal interpretation of Title III, extend-
ing the admissibility of evidence obtained through
wiretaps.
NEw YORK TELEPHONE CO. V. UNrED STATES
In New York Telephone Co., the District Court for
the Southern District of New York had authorized
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
to use pen registers to investigate an allegedly
illegal gambling operation. The district court also
directed the telephone company to provide the FBI
with technical assistance and facilities so that the
FBI could install and operate the pen registers. The
telephone company refused to lease lines to the
FBI23 which were needed to install the pen registers
without the suspects' knowledge. When the tele-
phone company moved to vacate that part of the
order directing it to assist the FBI, the district court
held thit pen registers are not governed by Title
III, and that the All Writs Act2' and the inherent
powers of the court allow a district court to order
the telephone company to help install pen registers.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit agreed that pen registers are not
covered by Title III and that courts have the
20 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
21429 U.S. 413 (1977).
2 Id at 434, 437, 439.
' Telephone company regulations prohibited it from
giving this type of assistance. The telephone company
said that the principal reason it opposed giving technical
assistance was its fear that this would lead to indiscrimi-
nate invasions of privacy. Application of United States
in matter of order authorizing the use of a Pen Register,
538 F.2d 956, 962 (2d Cir. 1976).
2 See note 5 supra.
power-akin to the power given courts by Rule 41
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure2-.-o
authorize the use of pen registers.26 However, the
court of appeals in an opinion written by Judge
Medina, in which Judge Feinbergjoined, held that
neither the inherent power of the court nor the All
Writs Act allowed the district court to order the
telephone company to assist the FBI. The appellate
court also held that even if, arguendo, the district
court could, under the All Writs Act and its inher-
ent power, direct the telephone company to assist
the government, the district court should not have
exercised this power until it had specific Congres-
sional authorization to do so.Y The circuit court's
decision reasoned that district courts should not
order telephone companies to install pen registers
until Congress specifically gives district courts the
authority to do so because "without Congressional
authority, such an order [to the telephone com-
pany] could establish a most undesirable ... prec-
edent for the authority of federal courts to impress
unwilling aid on private third parties. ' 28 "
Judge Mansfield concurred with the majority's
holding that Title III does not govern pen registers
and that courts have the power to authorize their
use. However, unlike the majority, he said that the
district court should order the telephone company
to assist if such aid was necessary for the FBI to use
the pen registers. He noted that the 1970 amend-
ments to Title III, 9 which allow district courts to
' See note 4 supra. The court of appeals said that FED.
R. CriM. P. 41 only gives courts the power to authorize
the search and seizure of tangible property. But using the
"commonsense approach" adopted by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in United States v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 531
F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976), the court held that courts hav
a power similar to their authority under FED. R. CRtM.
P. 41 to authorize the search and seizure of intangible
items. 538 F.2d at 959.
26 538 F.2d at 959-60.
Id at 961.
2 Id at 962.
29 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4). This amendment states:
An order authorizing the interception of a wire or
oral communication shall, upon request of the ap-
plicant, direct that a communication common car-
rier, landlord, custodian or other person shall fur-
nish the applicant forthwith all information, facili-
ties, and technical assistance necessary to accom-
plish the interception unobtrusively and with a
minimum of interference with the services that such
carrier, landlord, custodian, or person is according
the person whose communications are to be inter-
cepted. Any communication common carrier,
landlord, custodian or other person furnishing such
facilities or technical assistance shall be compen-
sated therefore by the applicant at the prevailing
rates.
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order telephone companies to help install and op-
erate wiretaps, do not establish any limitations or
safeguards on this aid.
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Cir-
cuit's decision that district courts could not order
telephone companies to install pen registers. The
Court unanimously agreed with the court of ap-
peals that Title III does not cover the use of pen
registers. However, the majority of the Courta° also
held that Fed. R. Grim. P. 41 allows district courts
to authorize the use of pen registers and that the
All Writs Act gives district courts the authority to
order telephone companies to install pen registers.
First, the Supreme Court held that Title III does
not govern pen registers. Justice White, writing for
the majority, noted that Title III deals with orders
"authorizing and approving the interception of a
wire or oral communication."' The act defines
"intercept" as "the aural acquisition of the contents
of any wire or oral communication through the use
of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
32
"Contents... include any information concerning
the identity of the parties to [the] communication
or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of
[the] communication."3 3 Based on these definitions,
the Supreme Court held that "pen registers do not
'intercept' because they do not acquire the 'con-
tents' of communications . ... Furthermore, pen
registers do not accomplish the 'aural acquisition'
of anything."'' The Court also noted that the
legislative history shows that Title III is not meant
to cover pen registers2 35 The Court held further
that pen registers are no longer governed by § 605
of the Communications Act of 1934, since Title III
amended that section to make it apply only to
"radio communications."3 6
o Five justices, Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, agreed with
the entire decision of the Court. Justice Stewart only
agreed that Title III does not cover pen registers and that
FED. R. CRI.M. P. 41 allows district courts to authorize the
use of pen registers. Justices Brennan and Marshall only
agreed that Title III does not cover pen registers.
3' 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1).
3 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
33 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
34 434 U.S. at 167.
3 Id. at 167-68. The Senate Report on Title Ill states:
Paragraph 4 [of § 25101 defines "intercept" to in-
clude the aural acquisition of the contents of any
wire or oral communication by any electronic, me-
chanical, or other device. Other forms of surveil-
lance are not within the proposed legislation....
The proposed legislation is not designed to prevent
the tracing of phone calls. The use of a "pen regis-
ter," for example, would be permissible.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1968).
36434 U.S. at 168 n.13.
The majority of the Court37 held that district
courts have the power to authorize government
officials to use pen registers. The Court's opinion
reasoned that Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b) authorizes
district courts to issue warrants to search and seize
property s Although the Court acknowledged that
rule 41(h) defines property only "to include docu-
ments, books and any other tangible objects," they
said that this was not an exhaustive list of all of
the types of property covered by Rule 41.3
The Court's opinion also noted that two other
factors supported the district court's authorization
of pen registers. First, Fed. R. Crim. P. 57(b)
provides: "If no procedure is specifically prescribed
by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful
manner not inconsistent with these rules or with
any applicable statute." 4 Second, the legislative
history of Title III indicates that Congress intended
the use of pen registers to be legal.4
After determining that district courts have the
power to authorize the installation of pen registers
upon a finding of probable cause, the Court's
opinion42 held that the All Writs Act' gives district
courts the power to order telephone companies to
assist federal officials in installing and operating
pen registers. The Court noted that the evidence
in this particular case showed that unless the tele-
phone company aided the government officials in
installing the pen registers, the district court's order
permitting the use of pen registers would be worth-
less: The FBI officials physically could not have
installed the pen registers on their own. Since the
district courts have the power to authorize the use
of pen registers, the Court reasoned that they also
must have the power to make sure the officials can
use them.
44
The Court stated that federal district courts can
use the All Writs Act to compel third parties who
are not participants in a particular investigation to
assist the court in conducting that investigation. In
this particular case, the Court noted first, that the
telephone company's facilities were allegedly being
37 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White,
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.
as See note 4 supra.
39 434 U.S. at 169.
40°Id at 170. The Court specifically refrained from
saying that FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) is sufficient authori-
zation by itself for allowing the district courts to authorize
pen registers.
41 Id. See also note 34 supra.
42 The five justices who agreed with this holding were
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist.
43 See note 5 supra.
44 434 U.S. at 175-76.
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used for illegal purposes. Second, the Court recog-
nized that the phone company itself used pen
registers in its normal business operation. It was,
therefore, not a great inconvenience to require the
company to help the government install them in
this situation. Finally, and most importantly, ac-
cording to the Court, the government simply could
not use pen registers at all without the company's
help.
Moreover, the Court noted that after the Ninth
Circuit in an earlier case held that district courts
could not compel telephone company assistance in
wiretap cases, ' Congress promptly overruled that
decision by amending Title III to give courts that
power.46 Since the legislative history of Title III
reveals that Congress intended the use of pen reg-
isters to be a permissible form of electronic surveil-
lance, 4' it must be presumed that Congress would
not object to courts ordering telephone company
assistance in pen register cases.8
Two justices authored opinions in which they
dissented in part. Justice Stewart agreed with the
majority that the district court could authorize
government officials to use pen registers.' 9 How-
ever, he agreed with Justice Stevens' dissent that
the court could not force the telephone company
to help officials install and operate the pen regis-
ters.o
Justice Stevens' dissent, in his dissent, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, stated that he
disagreed that the district courts could authorize
the use of pen registers.5" He believed that the
federal district courts cannot issue any type of
search warrant without a specific Congressional
authorization detailing the nature of and the re-
quirements for the warrant. Justice Stevens cited
Title III in which Congress authorized wiretaps as
an example of the type of specific authorization
that must be given before the courts can issue a
warrant.52 Title IX of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which allows courts
to issue search warrants for "mere evidence, '"ss was
cited by Stevens as another example of the specific
authorization needed.- Since, as the majority had
admitted, pen registers are not covered by the act,
5Application of the United States, 427 F.2d 639 (9th
Cir. 1970).
46 See note 29 supra.47 See note 34 supra.
4434 U.S. at 176-78.
' a at 178 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part).
50ia,
" rd at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
2rd at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
' In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), the
Court held that the only type of property which the
Justice Stevens reasoned that no Congressional
authorization exists for the issuance of a warrant
for such devices.
Justice Stevens further analyzed the history of
Title IX to show that Rule 41 is not a general
authorization to issue all types of warrants allowed
under the fourth amendment. Prior to 1967, the
Court had held that it was unconstitutional for the
government to seize "mere evidence."' 5 As a result,
Rule 41(b) had only authorized district courts to
issue warrants for search and seizure of "contra-
band, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise crim-
inally possessed" or "property designed or intended
for use or which is or has been used as the means
of committing a criminal offense." In Warden v.
Hayden,56 the Court held that. a police officer could
seize "mere evidence" in a search incident to an
arrest. Relying on Professor Wright's treatise,"c
Justice Stevens argued that, after Warden v. Hayden,
but before Title IX, the government could seize
mere evidence in conjunction with an arrest, but
courts could not issue search warrants for mere
evidence.ss In 1968 Congress passed Title IX,
which allowed courts to issue search warrants for
mere evidence, and in 1972 Rule 41(b) was
amended59 to allow courts to issue warrants to
search and seize "property that constitutes evi-
dence of the commission of a criminal offense."
Stevens argued, however, that if Rule 41(b) al-
lowed courts to issue any warrants not prohibited
by the fourth amendment or if "property" were
merely illustrative of the sorts of things obtainable
by a search and seizure, Congress would not have
bothered to pass Title IX, and Rule 41(b) would
not have been amended in 1972.60
government could seize was property that had some
intrinsic value. It could not take property that was "mere
evidence," that is, only useful as evidence against a
person. In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the
Court qualified its earlier holding by ruling that a police
officer can seize mere evidence in a search which takes
place during an arrest. The next year Congress passed
Title IX of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 which allows the government to seize mere
evidence in searches which do not take place during
arrests.
" 434 U.S. at 182-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
' See note 48 supra.
-6 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
57 3 C. WRiGHT, FEDERAL PRATICE AND PRocEDuRE 41
(1969).
' 434 U.S. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
"0 434 U.S. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). It is
interesting to note Justice Stevens' reliance on Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, for the proposition that in the
absence of Congressional authorization, police could seize
mere evidence in conjunction with arrests but courts
could not issue search warrants for mere evidence. Warden
1078]
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In addition, Justice Stevens claimed that Rule
41 does not give district courts the power to au-
thorize pen registers because many of the limita-
tions on searches and seizures listed in that rule are
not applicable to pen registers. These limitations,
which are designed to insure the reasonableness of
the search and seizure, cannot be followed when
the government uses pen registers. For example, he
pointed out that Rule 4 1(c) provides that officials
must prepare an inventory of the property to be
seized in the presence of the person whose property
is to be seized. 61 But, FBI officials using pen regis-
ters to seize phone numbers do not tell the parties
using the phone that the government is taking the
phone numbers.
62
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority's
contention that the All Writs Act gives district
courts the power to order telephone companies to
assist in the installation and operation of pen reg-
isters. The purpose of a court order under the All
Writs Act, according to Justice Stevens, is to aid
the court in performing its duties and exercising its
jurisdiction. The court cannot use the All Writs
Act simply to order one party to help another party
could be cited for another proposition altogether; it illus-
trates the fact that the judiciary, acting in the absence of
specific Congressional authorization, can set its own stan-
dards for search and seizure.
Similarly, in several cases federal judges have author-
ized the use of electronic surveillance devices, although
no statutes specifically authorized them to do so. For
example, in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966),
two district court judges authorized FBI agents to put a
recorder on an informant in order to obtain an accurate
account of the conversations he had with a lawyer sus-
pected of bribing a juror. The Court held that because
the government had obtained antecedent judicial au-
thorization, the recordings were admissible. 385 U.S. at
330-31. See also Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
61 434 U.S. at 185 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
62 While it is true that FED. R. CraM. P. 41 safeguards
are not entirely applicable to pen registers, the Court has
modified these safeguards in the past to make them
applicable to electronic surveillance. In a footnote, the
majority discusses how in Katz the Court stated that
contrary to FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d), one did not have to
give notice to the person "searched" prior to the com-
mencement of electronic surveillance. 434 U.S. at 169-70
n.16 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 355-56 n.16). Katz held
that antecedent judicial authorization is necessary for
electronic surveillance and the Court stated that a judge
authorizing the use of such devices would require "ap-
propriate safeguards" similar, though not identical, to
those of conventional constitutionally permissible war-
rants. 389 U.S. at 354. But the notice requirement could
be omitted because "officers need not announce their
purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized
search if such an announcement would provoke the es-
cape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence."
Id. at 355 n.16.
perform its duties or exercise its rights. Rather, the
court can only use the act to require a party to help
the court perform its functions. Stevens noted that
an order to the telephone company merely aids the
government's interests, not the court's jurisdic-
tion.63 And, while the government may have a
right to use pen registers to gather evidence, Justice
Stevens claimed that it is not the court's function
to gather the evidence.' Orders under the All
Writs Act, according to Justice Stevens, should be
analogous to common-law writs.ss He argued than
an order requiring the telephone company's assist-
ance in setting up a pen register is similar to a writ
of assistance,66 one of the governmental abuses that
the American Revolution was intended to elimi-
nate.
67
As Justice Stevens so aptly stated, there is indeed
a difficulty raised by the majority's reasoning that
Rule 41 authorizes the use of pen registers. That
difficulty is the Court's expansion of the term
"property." Rule 41 clearly authorizes the issuance
of warrants to search for and seize any "property
that constitutes evidence ' and defines "property"
"to include documents, books and any other tan-
gible objects." 6 And, as a familiar Latin maxim
states: inclusio unius exclusio alterius" (the enumera-
tion of certain things in a statute implies the exclu-
sion of others).70 As Justice Stevens noted, the
enumeration in Rule 41(h) ends with "other tan-
63 434 U.S. at 187-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
64The majority pointed out, 434 U.S. at 173, that
courts do have jurisdiction to authorize searches and
seizures and to make sure that they are performed rea-
sonably. The Court cited Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286,
299 (1969), which held that courts may require inter-
rogatories for a habeas corpus proceeding even though
they have no specific authority to do so.
"434 U.S. at 187 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
6Writs of assistance were prevalent during colonial
times. They commanded "all officers and subjects of the
crown to assist" the government in searches and seizures
and gave the government authority to require citizens to
assist it during the life of the sovereign who issued the
writ. Id at 180 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (quot-
ing N. LAssON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FouRTH AMENDMENT 51-55 (1937)).
67 434 U.S. at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
However, the case law refutes the idea that writs issued
under the All Writs Act must be analogous to common
law writs. In Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), the
Court specifically stated that writs were not set in the
1700's. Speaking of the law that preceded the All Writs
Act, the Court said it was "not confined to the precise
forms of that writ in vogue at the common law or in the
English judicial system." Id at 282.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b). See note 4 supra.
69 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h). See note 4 supra.
70Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17, 44-45 (D. Mass.
1920), rev'don other grounds, 277 F. 129 (Ist Cir. 1922).
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gible property,"71 which would seem to limit the
use of warrants to tangible property. The New York
Telephone majority cited one case to show that since
"property" is defined to "include" the listed items,
the definition is not exclusive. However, in that
case, Helvering v. Morgan's Inc.,7 the Court had held
that a definition using the word "include" was not
exclusive because the statute it was examining, the
Revenue Act of 1926, specifically stated, "The
terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a
definition contained in this Act shall not be deemed
to exclude other things otherwise within the mean-
ing of the term defined."73 Helvering, in fact, seems
to indicate that if a definition using the word
"include" is not meant to be exclusive, the statute
must specifically so state.
Despite this obvious and perhaps unjustified
expansion of Rule 41, the majority's ruling is logi-
cal and in keeping with common sense. Since courts
can constitutionally authorize the use of wiretaps,
they should also be able to authorize the use of pen
registers which involve less extensive intrusions
than wiretaps. 74 There are no federal statutes pro-
hibiting the use of pen registers75 and the legislative
history of Title III shows that Congress wishes to
permit their use. 76 Therefore, it seems reasonable
that courts can authorize the use of pen registers.
This conclusion is also consistent with the
Court's other decisions on search and seizure. Al-
though Rule 41(h) still refers only to warrants for
the search and seizure of tangible, physical prop-
erty, recent cases have recognized that an intangi-
ble interest, privacy, as well as property, is pro-
tected by the fourth amendment.7 In Warden v.
Haydeni,78 for instance, the Court maintained that
"the premise that property interests control the
right of the Government to search and seize has
been discredited." In sum, it simply appears that
the rules of criminal procedure have not caught up
with the Court's view that the law of search and
seizure also extends to the area of privacy.
On the opposite spectrum, there is a difficulty
with the majority's reasoning behind ordering the
telephone company to assist the federal govern-
71434 U.S. at 184 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
72293 U.S. 121 (1934).
73 Id at 125 n.1.
7" Wiretaps can also be used to determine the tele-
phone numbers dialed. United States v. Falcone, 505
F.2d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955
(1975).7 See note 17 supra.
78 See note 34 supra.
77 See note 14 and accompanying text supra.78 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
ment in installing the pen registers. The Court is
requiring a third party who is not involved in the
investigation to help affirmatively the courts catch
criminals. But, none of the cases cited by the Court
in support of this ruling is directly on point. In two
of the cases cited by the majority, Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co. v. United Statesss and Board of Education
v. York s an affirmative duty was created, but the
courts were not asking private citizens to help catch
criminals. In United States v. McHie6' and United
States v. Field82 lower federal courts did require
third parties to turn over books and papers that
were in their possession, but these holdings were
merely in keeping with the tradition of requiring
third parties to present evidences and did not in
any way command them to assist affirmatively the
government in gathering evidence. In a footnote,
the Court in New York Telephone cites several casesss
where third parties helped catch criminals. How-
ever, in all of these cases the third party voluntarily
pursued the criminals. None of these cases support
the proposition that the courts have the power to
force third parties to help the government develop
criminal cases.
Even though there may be no precedent requir-
ing active law enforcement assistance on the part
of third parties, under the circumstances of this
case, this again seems the logical path for the Court
to have taken. Since Congress has clearly provided
that the district courts can order telephone com-
panies to assist with wiretaps, s it seems logical that
the district courts should also be able to compel
phone companies to assist with pen registers
s7
7273 F. Supp. I (E.D. Mo. 1967), afJ'd, 389 U.S. 579
(1968). The court held that it could enforce an order
against third parties who were not parties to the lawsuit.
8 429 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
954 (1971). The court's jurisdiction over public school
segregation problems empowered it to issue an injunction
requiring parents to send their child to a certain school.
1 196 F. 586 (N.D. Il1. 1912).
'82 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1951).
8 FED. R. CraM. P. 17 allows district courts to issue
subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum to people who are
,not parties to the suit and to hold those who do not
comply with these subpoenas in contempt.
8'434 U.S. at 175-76 n.24.
85 434 U.S. at 1-76 n.24 citing Hamilton v. Regents,
293 U.S. 245, 265 n. (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring); In
re Quarles v. Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895); Elrod v.
Moss, 278 F. 123, 129 (4th Cir. 1921); Barrington v.
Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 17, 164 N.E. 726, 727
(1928).
s6 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4).87 Even the dissent implies that the authorization of
pen registers and the coercion of.the phone companies is
logical. Justice Stevens said, "[Tlhe Court's rush to
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Finally, while this was apparently not argued at
• any stage of the proceedings, the very nature of
phone companies-highly regulated companies
granted monopolies in most of the services they
provide the public-may impose upon them a
special duty to assist the government when it be-
comes necessary.
ScoTT v. UNITED STATES
In Scott v. United States,8s the Court was again
faced with a Title III question. In that case, the
United States District Court for the District of
Columbia had, pursuant to Title III, authorized
federal officials to wiretap a residential phone to
learn about an alleged narcotics ring. The order
required the agents to conduct the wiretap in "such
a way as to minimize the interception of commu-
nications that are [not] otherwise subject to inter-
ception. ' ' 9 For the thirty-day period authorized by
the warrant, the agents intercepted every call on
that phone. Forty percent of these calls were nar-
cotics-related. 90
In a pretrial motion, the defendants moved to
suppress the wiretap evidence. They claimed that
the government had not minimized the intercep-
tion of conversations not related to narcotics as
Title III and the district court's order required.
The district court agreed and suppressed the evi-
dence.9 The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded, holding that the district court had to
make "an assessment of the reasonableness of the
agents' efforts in light of the purpose of the wiretap
and the information available to them at the time"
of the interception. s2 On remand, the district court
again held that the agents had violated the min-
imization rule, but the court of appeals again
disagreed.93 This time, the court of appeals itself
reviewed the evidence and determined that all the
interceptions had been reasonable. 94 On remand
achieve a logical result must await congressional delib-
erations." 434 U.S. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).8898 S. Ct. 1717 (1978).
89 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). See note 1 supra.
90 United States v. Scott. 516 F.2d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir.
1975). Most of the rest were either short or ambiguous.
Seven of the calls were between Geneva Jenkins, the
person in whose name the phone was listed, and her
mother. Id. at 757.
91 United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233 (D. D.C.
1971).
92 United States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194, 198 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
93 516 F.2d 751.
9 United States v. Scott, 522 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir.
1975). Four judges dissented from the court of appeals'
decision to deny a rehearing en banc. Justice Brennan,
again, the district court finally convicted the de-
fendants and the court of appeals affirmed. 5
When the case eventually reached the Supreme
Court, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
affirmed the court of appeals decision. The Su-
preme Court's decision in Scott, however, was less
controversial than its decision in the New York
Telephone Co. case, because the Scott Court simply
interpreted Title III in a way very similar to the
way that previous Supreme Court decisions dealt
with the law. In previous decisions, the Court had
set up a two-fold analytical model to use in dealing
with Title III. First, the Court would question
whether the action at issue violated the statute.
Second, if it did, the Court would consider whether
the violated provision was central to the act.96
In Scott, the Court held that the FBI had not
even violated the minimization provision of the
statute. The Court said that the proper way to
determine whether the FBI agents had followed
the minimization rule was to judge their actions in
light of the facts and circumstances that confronted
them when they were doing the wiretapping. The
Court stated that this is the way that all alleged
violations of the fourth amendment are determined
and cited United States v. Robinson97 for the proposi-
tion that an officer's motivation for conducting a
search is immaterial to the admissibility of evidence
so obtained.98 Having held motive unimportant,
the Court found it unnecessary to determine what
the motive of the government agents in Scott was.9
The Court claimed that Title III, instead, requires
an objective assessment of the agents' actions. The
statute's language directs searches to be "con-
ducted" so as to minimize the interceptions on
irrelevant phone calls.'00 This language, the Court
reasoned, indicated that the focus was on actions,
joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the Supreme
Court's decision not to grant certiorari at that time.
United States v. Scott, 425 U.S. 917 (1976).
'6 For a discussion of this analytical model, see 68 J.
CRtM. L. & C. 505, 508 (1977).
9 For a discussion of this analytical model, see Note,
Federal Law-Wiretaps, 68. J. CrM. L & C. 505, 508
97 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
98 In Robinson, a police officer searched a man after
arresting him for driving while his license was revoked.
The Court held that the fact that the officer did not fear
the suspect or think that he was armed was immaterial.
Id. at 235.
9 In a footnote, it recognized that the government
disputes the district court's finding that the agents sub-
jectively intended to violate the Constitution or-the stat-
ute. However, the Court said it expressed "no view on
this matter." 98 S. Ct. at 1723 n.l1.
'oo 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). See note 1 supra.
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not motives. In addition, the Court pointed out
that the legislative history reveals that Title III was
not intended "generally to press the scope of the
suppression role beyond present search and seizure
law.'' Therefore, the standard must be the objec-
tive reasonableness of the agents' actions and not
their subjective motives.
Twice in this discussion, however, the Court
recognized that motive is sometimes important.
First, the Court said that if there is a statutory or
constitutional violation,"e then a court might want
to consider the agents' motives in determining
whether to exclude the evidence. If an examination
of the evidence shows that the agents did not
minimize and if the agents acted in bad faith, then
courts may want to exclude the evidence to deter
agents from acting in bad faith in the future.1
3
Second, in a footnote," the Court recognized that
judges may, in practice, occasionally take motive
into account when they are determining whether
a person's actions show minimization. For example,
if a judge believes that a federal agent did not act
in good faith, he may not believe the agent's claims
about what information he had available to him
at the time of the search.
After determining that the proper test is the
reasonableness of the agents' actions, the Court
discussed what factors are important in making
this evaluation. The percentage of nonpertinent
calls was considered by the Court to be only one
factor. A court must also consider the character of
nonpertinent calls: if such calls were very short,
ambiguous or one-time calls, the agents may rea-
sonably have intercepted them.1s5 Other important
factors were thought to be the circumstances of the
wiretap, the type of use the phone normally re-
ceives, and the time during the authorized period
at which the agents intercepted the calls. Based on
these factors, the Court determined that the agents
in Scott did minimize their interception of nonper-
tinent phone calls.' 6
to' S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (April 29,
1968), repinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2185.
10 An example of a statutory violation is an agent's
failure to list in the wiretap application all of the people
he has probable cause to believe are committing an
offense. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
0398 S. Ct. at 1724 n.13.
104,rd
'05 Id at 1724-25.
104 In Scott, 407o of the calls were narcotics related.
Because most of the rest were short or ambiguous or one-
time conversations, it was reasonable to intercept them.
Of the seven calls between the owner of the phone and
her mother, the first four were at the beginning of the
Justices Brennan and Marshall disagreed with
the Court's entire analysis. Justice Brennan stated,
in a dissent in which Justice Marshall joined, that
the Court had misinterpreted the statute and had
thereby eliminated one of the safeguards that Con-
gress had established.' °7 Justice Brennan inter-
preted the minimization provision to mean that
the agents must make a good faith effort to mini-
mize the calls. He relied on the finding of the
district court that the agents "did not even attempt
'lip service' compliance to the provision," for they
monitored every call, sixty percent of which were
not pertinent.1 This, according to Justice Bren-
nan, indicated that the agents lacked good faith in
their actions. Justice Brennan also complained that
it is impossible to determine whether an agent has
acted "reasonably" because one can never know
whether he would have intercepted fewer calls if
he had made a good faith effort to do so.'09 The
result of the majority's test, according to Justice
Brennan, is that government agents can now dis-
regard this section, in violation of the statute's
purpose to limit severely the use of interceptions as
a means of protecting individual privacy. As Jus-
tice Brennan complained, the majority's holding
reduces the deterrent value of the statute's exclu-
sionary remedy."
0
Justice Brennan also disagreed with the major-
ity's view that minimization should be treated like
other fourth amendment procedures. He noted that
none of the cases cited by the majority referred to
electronic surveillance, and thus reasoned that the
plain language of the statute should take prece-
dence over general fourth amendment principles."'
He also felt that the majority's decision undercut
the reasoning of United States v. Kahn,"2 in which
the Court relied on the minimization clause to
surveillance, and two of them suggested that the mother
knew about the narcotics conspiracy. The last three calls
also indicated that the mother may have had some
knowledge of the conspiracy. Id at 1725-26.
"'
7 d. at-, 98 S. Ct. at 1726 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'ts United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. at 247.
'9 98 S. Ct. at 1727 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 tOId.
11id at 1728 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1z 415 U.S. 143. In Kahn, although government agents
were tapping the Kahn family home, they did not have
probable cause to believe that Mrs. Kahn was involved
in her husband's illegal gambling operation and had not
included her name in their application for a wiretap.
However, they did listen to her calls and obtained evi-
dence from them. The Court held that this activity did
not violate Title IIs requirement that the government
list all parties whose conversations would be intercepted.
1978]
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safeguard against unlimited invasions of privacy.
The Court in Kahn held that the requirement of
only identifying those people who the government
had probable cause to believe were committing
crimes would not allow the government "to seize
at will every communication that came over the
line." 113 The Court reasoned that the government
still had "to execute the warrant in such a manner
as to minimize the interception of any innocent
conversation."'1 4 Justice Brennan argued that be-
cause of the Scott decision, the minimization clause
no longer prevents the government from seizing at
will every conversation that comes over the tapped
line as the Kahn Court had relied on." 5 Although
the government agents in Scott had intercepted
every call that came over the line, the Court held
that the agents had not violated Title III's min-
imization clause. Justice Brennan concluded by
warning that if the Court continues to dilute Title
III's safeguards, the act itself may violate the fourth
amendment.1
6
As a further criticism of the majority's opinion,
it appears strange that the Court would hold that
an agent's intent should not influence the court's
determination of whether the agent complied with
the minimization requirement. However, the cases
cited by the Court do show why intent really
cannot be relevant. For example, in Klinger v. United
States," 7 a policeman ordered to find a robbery
suspect stopped a car matching the description of
the getaway vehicle and arrested the driver for
vagrancy. He also seized a pistol, which the de-
fendant moved to suppress at trial. The policeman
testified that when he arrested Klinger for va-
grancy, he did not think that he had "enough
facts" to arrest him for robbery. The court of
appeals said the policeman's motives were imma-
terial. What was important was whether he ac-
tually did have probable cause to arrest the de-
fendant for robbery." 8 After all, if he had had good
motives, but had not had probable cause, the
evidence should have been suppressed.
The facts in Scott show how difficult it can be to
determine what an agent's motives were. The rec-
ord revealed that in Scott the agents knew about
the minimization rule, and before they started,
they decided that they would not intercept any
113 la at 154-55.
14 Id. at 154.
" 98 S. Ct. at 1728 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'16 Id. at 1729 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217 409 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
859 (1969).
11 Id at 304.
privileged phone calls. 19 And, when they discov-
ered at one point that they were tapping the wrong
line, they disconnected that tap. Every five days
the agents told the judge how many calls they had
listened to and how many of these calls were
narcotics-related. They had not, however, actually
stopped listening to or recording any call because
they thought it was not pertinent. On the basis of
this information, it might be difficult indeed for a
court to decide whether the agents had used good
faith judgment when they were tapping the phone.
Not only does it appear that the Court majority
correctly decided that one must determine objec-
tively whether an agent followed the minimization
rule, the Court also appears to have correctly de-
cided that the agents did minimize their intercep-
tion of irrelevant calls. Justice Brennan himself set
forth some principles for minimization in his dis-
sent to a denial of certiorari in Bynum v. United
States,'2 0 and based on these principles, the inter-
ceptions in Scott were minimized. In Bynum, Justice
Brennan had maintained that "agents must inev-
itably listen briefly to all calls in order to determine
the parties to and the nature of the con-
versation. ' ' 2 Thus, under Justice Brennan's own
standard in Bynum, the fact that the agents in Scott
-intercepted every call and that sixty percent of
them were not related to narcotics is not important.
Justice Brennan had stated, too; that
"[n]ecessarily, calls of short duration," which he
defined as calls lasting three minutes or less, "will
generally have to be monitored in toto."' 22 The
record demonstrated that many of the Scott calls
were short, such as ninety second phone messages
about the weather and wrong numbers. According
to Justice Brennan's own standards in Bynum, these
would generally have had to have been entirely
monitored. In Bynum, Justice Brennan thought the
agents should not have intercepted calls between a
babysitter for the suspect's child and her boy-
friend. 123 In Scott, there apparently was no call as
obviously nonpertinent.
CONCLUSION
The differences between New York Telephone Co.
and Scott are obvious. New York Telephone Co. con-
cerns the use of pen registers and primarily involves
19 516 F.2d at 755 n.9. Privileged calls are those
between e.g., a doctor and his patient, an attorney and
his client, or a priest and a penitent.
120 423 U.S. 952 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). •





interpreting statutes other than Title III. It also
deals with the propriety of forcing a third party
who is not a participant in the investigation to help
the government. Scott is solely an interpretation of
the minimization requirement of Title III.
Yet, on a deeper level, the cases are very similar.
First, both may be seen as part of a continuing
trend to interpret the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act liberally to allow the government
to use the fruits of electronic surveillance. The
dissents in both cases recognize and deplore this
trend. As Justice Stevens in New York Telephone Co.
stated:
Today's decision appears to present no radical de-
parture from this Court's prior holdings. It builds
upon previous intimations that a federal district
court's power to issue a search warrant under Fed.
Rule Crim. Proc. 41 is a flexible one, not strictly
restained by statutory authorization, and it applies
the same flexible analysis to the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a).'24
Similarly, Scott, according to Justice Brennan,
marked the "third decision in which the Court has
disregarded or diluted congressionally established
safeguards designed to prevent Government elec-
tronic surveillance from becoming the abhorred
general warrant which historically had destroyed
the cherished expectation of privacy in the
home."'
125
In deciding both of these cases, the Court favored
a flexible interpretation of the relevant statutory
provisions. In New York Telephone Co., the Court
held that "property" in Rule 41126 was broad
enough to cover electronic surveillance, and the
phrase "the court may order all writs" in the All
Writs Act 27 was broad enough to cover an order
to the telephone company to help the government
install pen registers. In Scott, the Court held that
Title III's "shall be conducted in such a way as to
minimize"'12 language meant that the searcher did
not actually have to try to minimize as long as he
did as much minimizing as a reasonable person in
his situation would have.
Furthermore, in each case, the majority relied
heavily on interpretations of the Congressional in-
tent in enacting Title III. In New York Telephone Co.,
124 434 U.S. at 178 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
'25 98 S. Ct. at 1726 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12
6 See note 4 supra.
'27 See note 5 supra.
1
2
s See note I supra.
the majority cited the legislative history of Title III
to show that Congress wanted pen registers to be
permissible. The justices also noted that it would
be very unlikely for Congress to have authorized
wiretapping without also allowing the use of the
less-intrusive pen registers. The majority in Scott
also relied on legislative history, here to demon-
strate that Title III was not intended "generally to
press the scope of the suppression role beyond
present search and seizure law,"' 29 which does not
consider the government's motives in deciding
whether to suppress evidence.
Through these liberal interpretations of the stat-
utes, the Court in the two cases has increased the
government's ability to use electronic surveillance
devices. Yet, the dissenting opinions in each case
seemed to state that these two cases are'not in and
of themselves of much significance. In New York
Telephone Co. Justice Stevens said that telephone
companies will probably not mind assisting in
installing pen registers since they will be paid a
normal profit by the government.13 Similarly, Jus-
tice Brennan called the Scott decision merely
an "incremental denigration of Title III's
safeguards., 13' Still, the dissenting justices fear
what these cases could mean in the future. Justice
Stevens fears that after New York Telephone Co.
courts may use Rule 41 and the All Writs Act to
expand the power of the judiciary even further.'32
And, Justice Brennan warns that if the Court
continues to interpret Title III as it did in Scott,'
33
Donovan,'3 4 Chavez,' s and Kahn,136 then Title III
may violate the fourth amendment standards an-
nounced in Berger and Katz.1
3 7
Both of these decisions demonstrate that there
are several issues which the court is likely to face in
the near future. First, the Court will undoubtedly
have to clarify what procedures are necessary be-
fore the government can use pen registers.'3 8 Sec-
12998 S. Ct. at 1724 (quoting S. REP. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 96 (April 29, 1968), reprinted in [1968]
U.S. CODE CoNa. & AD. NEws 2185).
'30 434 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
3 98 S. Ct. at 1728-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
-2 434 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
'3398 S. Ct. 1717 (1978).
'34 429 U.S. 413. See note 21 and accompanying text
sup ra.
'416 U.S. 562. See note 20 and accompanying text
sup ra_
1. 415 U.S. 143. See note 19 and accompanying text
-upra.
"m 98 S. Ct. at 1728-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'
3 In New York Telephone Co., the district court found
there was probable cause to believe that the telephones
were being used as part of an illegal gambling operation.
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ond, the Court will probably have to determine
how to treat other types of electronic surveillance
devices, some of which have already been discussed
by lower courts,' 39 which are not explicitly covered
In its order, the district court said that the FBI could use
pen registers until it learned who the people involved in
the gambling operation were or for 20 days, "whichever
is earlier." 434 U.S. at 162. However, in Martin v.
DeSilvia, 556 F.2d 356, 361 n.4 (1st Cir. 1977), the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit interpreted New York
Telephone Co. as holding that government officials did not
need a judicial warrant before using pen registers in
criminal investigations. Yet New York Telephone Co. said
that district courts could authorize the use of pen registers
because of FEV. R. CRIM. P. 41 which relates to the
issuance of a warrant. 434 U.S. at 168. In the future, the
Court will probably clarify that the use of pen registers
must meet fourth amendment standards.
" In Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. United States,
565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), the Sixth Circuit held that
by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968.
As to Title III itself, the Court will probably not
interpret the statute in such a way that it will
violate the standards set out in Katz and Berger.
The statute, as interpreted, still requires antecedent
judicial authorization specifying, among other
things, the identity of the person whose conversa-
tions are to be intercepted, a description of the type
of conversations that will be intercepted and a time
limit on the length of the wiretap. The Court is
unlikely to tamper in a major way with any of
these safeguards.
card drops, which trace phone calls, should be treated
like pen registers. In United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d
517 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit held that the
attachment of electronic location devices to planes was
not a "search." Id at 520.
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